Interpol is the most widely recognised ‘brand name’ in transnational policing, but to whom, or what, is it accountable? In the democratic countries of the West, debates and discussions about accountability frameworks for policing agencies have typically focused on organisations that have a legally defined and narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction, referred to in this paper as the ‘standard paradigm’ for policing accountability. There is a lacuna in this literature which has to do with those few agencies that operate transnationally and which, in important but ill-understood ways, are only partially bound by the jurisdictional purview of sovereign nation-states. This paper examines the accountability framework of Interpol, with particular reference to its historically questionable status as an Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO). It looks at Interpol's modus operandi and explains why its workings can potentially become the subject of hot political contestation. It considers some of the important articles of the organisation's constitution and reflects upon the agency's changing role in policing the globe subsequent to the 9–11 attack. The nature of Interpol's accountability will be analysed by reference to a typology that includes internal, external, formal and informal accountability mechanisms. It is argued that a fundamental challenge for transnational institutions is how to create and maintain the lines of democratic accountability that render them legitimate.